A hunt through a resort's offline WMI repository that traces a fileless backdoor from a "clean" event-log binding down through Base64-and-UTF16-encoded PowerShell, a reflectively-loaded .NET payload hidden in a custom Win32_HardwareTelemetry class, and a quietly planted net user backdoor account.

MartiniAD is an Easy-difficulty Active Directory lab hosted by HackSmarter. The domain `DRY.MARTINI.BARS` is fronted by a single Domain Controller (`DC01`) that permits unauthenticated SMB null/guest sessions. This allows enumeration of a non-default share containing plaintext credentials for a low-privileged domain user. Those credentials are used to Kerberoast a service account, whose cracked password grants a foothold via WinRM. Password reuse between the service account and a linked human Tier-0 admin account (which sits in Domain Admins) then provides full domain compromise, culminating in a DCSync attack to extract the KRBTGT hash.

Compromising the ShadowGate Active Directory lab through a chained attack path — from AS-REP roasting and ACL abuse via Shadow Credentials, to coercing the Domain Controller with PetitPotam and relaying its authentication into a certificate-based DCSync — culminating in full domain compromise via the krbtgt hash.

In this HackSmarter SysAdmins lab, I chained anonymous FTP disclosure, OSINT, SNMPv3 username and credential reuse, and a critical sudo privilege escalation (CVE-2025-32463) to move from initial access to full root compromise.